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Abstract 
 
The present paper reports on a political choice 
experiment with elected real-world politicians. A 
questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to 
examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses 
of experts from the field better than rational choice 
theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but 
that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational 
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1-Introduction 
Rationality and consistency are crucial assumptions to most theories in 
the social sciences. Particularly, in neoclassical economics and political 
sciences it is common to assume that all agents make their decisions 
coherently with the utility maximization doctrine. Rational choice theories 
under certainty and under risk have been established as descriptive 
models for the decisions of consumers, producers, voters, politicians, etc. 
Experiments and empirical observations, yet, have revealed that actual 
behavior and decisions frequently depart from the neoclassical predictions. 
This evidence has led social scientists to develop descriptive analyses of 
choice, based on observed behavior and decisions. Prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) is an outstanding outcome of this 
research. In contrast to rational choice theory, it allows people’s 
preferences to depend on the circumstances they face. According to 
prospect theory, we make a decision dependent on our perception of 
whether the decision involves making a gain or a loss. This is at odds with 
the consistency or invariance assumptions of the rational theory. Whether 
we perceive an outcome as a loss or a gain -in turn- depends on our 
reference point (e.g., the status quo). If the outcome is better than the 
reference point we consider it as a gain, if it is worse it is considered as a 
loss. If it affects our perception even the framing of a decision problem –the 
stating of an identical problem in negative or positive terms- can provoke a 
preference reversal. Prospect theory predicts people to seek risk in the 
domain of losses and to behave risk averse in the domain of gains. 
Particularly important, in this context, is the notion of loss aversion 
presuming that people weigh gains less than losses. Last but not least, a 
cornerstone of prospect theory is the non-linear weighting function of 
chance events, according to which people overweigh small probabilities. 
The weighting function helps to accommodate, for instance, phenomena as 
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the Allais’ paradoxes -the common consequence and the common ratio 
effect. 
In the present study we test rational choice theory -in particular, 
expected utility theory- against prospect theory in a political choice 
context. We collect data with a questionnaire on hypothetical political 
choices as, for instance, the allocation decision of a public resource. The 
decision problems in our research replicate those of the classical 
experimental study in political sciences by Quattrone and Tversky (1988). 
Quattrone and Tversky reported systematic violations of expected utility 
theory in support of prospect theory. Their data provide evidence for 
framing effects and the common ratio effect. The respondents to their 
questionnaire were undergraduates at Stanford University or at the 
University of California at Berkeley. A non-unexpected question the reader 
might ask is whether the results of the study are meaningful in the sense 
that students are an adequate proxy for political decision makers (except 
for voting). After all, students are not used to make decisions involving 
millions of dollars and the well-being of thousands of citizens. A related 
argument is that experienced professionals may have very different (risk) 
attitudes and perceptions than student subjects. In the psychological 
literature this is labeled an issue of ‘subject surrogacy’. In this paper, we 
take up the subject surrogacy issue and examine the external validity of 
the results of Quattrone and Tversky with a subject pool of experts on 
political decision making. Specifically, we analyze the responses of elected 
politicians and compare them to a subject pool of students. The research 
question we address is thus whether experts violate rational choice theory 
and if their decisions differ significantly from those of non-expert subjects. 
The subject surrogacy issue has been raised repeatedly in the 
literature. Actually, the choice of the subject pool has been an important 
source of criticism against the experimental inquiry methods5. Over the 
last decades several studies have, therefore, replicated a broad range of 
                                                                 
5 See Kinder and Palfrey (1993) and Plott (1982) for a discussion. 
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experimental settings with professionals from the field, only to find non-
systematic differences with the standard samples, as Ball and Cech (1996) 
survey6. However, some studies in which risk and probability play a major 
role find differences between students and experts7. Some results indicate 
that professionals are more accurate at estimating probabilities8, but the 
accuracy varies apparently between domains in which professionals have 
become experts as Shanteau (1992) suggests. In some domains, such as 
weather forecasting, experts predict probabilities very accurately, in 
others, such as clinical psychology, rather not9. A possible consequence of 
smaller probability bias (if small probabilities are not overweighed), for 
instance, could be that Allais type violations of expected utility theory are 
less frequent10. In our research, actually, expert subjects are found less 
prone to the common ratio effect compared to non-expert subjects.  
Apart from the examination of the common ratio effect the present 
paper focuses on framing with respect to both risky and non-risky choices. 
Two of the four problem sets on framing involve a change from the domain 
of gains to the domain of losses. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) associate 
such domain changes with the reflection effect, according to which 
people’s preferences among negative prospects are a mirror image of their 
preferences among the corresponding positive prospects. The other two 
problem sets are more subtle applying the ratio-difference principle of 
                                                                 
6 Ball and Cech (1996) review studies by Siegel and Harnett (1964), , Hofstedt (1972), Abdel-Khalik (1974), 
Grether and Plott (1982), Hong and Plott (1982), Burns (1985), Abdolmohammadi and Wright (1987), 
Schurr (1987), DeJong et al. (1988), Mestelman and Feeny (1988), Dyer et al. (1989), King et al (1992), Lo et 
al. (1993), Anderson and Sunder (1995). 
7 Dyer et al. (1989) report that the professionals in their auction showed risk-neutrality, whereas the 
students exhibited risk-aversion. In contrast to this, Anderson and Sunder (1995) find that professional 
traders are more risk-averse but more accurate in estimating probabilities than students. Potters and van 
Winden (2002) find professional lobbyist more in line with the game theoretic prediction than students. 
8 Anderson and Sunder (1995), Önkal et al (2003) and Glaser et al (2003) among others report greater 
accuracy of professional traders’ estimates. 
9 See Murphy and Winkler (1977) and Stewart et al. (1997) for evidence on the performance of weather 
forecasters and Goldberg (1959), Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) or Dawes (1988) for 
evidence on doctors and clinical psychologists. Rohrbaugh and Shanteau (1999) survey this literature. 
10 Indeed, it is quite speculative to conjecture the existence of a link between probability bias and Allais’ 
paradoxes. In contrast to this conjecture stands, for instance, the experimental result of Bone et al (1999) 
who observe more violation of rational choice when they allow for repetition and group discussion 
within student subjects. 
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Quattrone and Tversky (1988). In these problems, framing has only a 
perceptual dimension induced by a change of a ratio while leaving the 
domain unchanged. The idea behind it goes back to psychophysics –‘the 
study of the functional relation between the physical and the psychological 
value of attributes such as size, brightness, or loudness. For instance, 
lighting a candle has more impact on illumination when initial 
illumination is poor than when it is good’- as Quattrone and Tversky (1988, 
p. 728) define it.  
Framing effects have been studied extensively by social scientists. 
Experimental evidence is mixed across framing types and subject pools11. 
Overall one may conclude that in risky framework subjects accept more 
risk when problems are framed in terms of losses than in terms of gains. 
Kühberger (1998) concludes on the basis of 136 research reports on 
framing risky decision that experiments reveal less frequently preference 
reversals the more they differ from the original framing (Asian disease) 
problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In a non-risky framework, more 
approval is given under conditions of positive framing (e.g., the success 
rate) than with negative framing (e.g., the failure rate) as Levin et al. 
(1998) point out.  
Kühberger (1998) suggests that framing influences experts, as well, 
but maybe to a lesser extent than students. On one hand, framing effects 
have been reported from studies on experts, for instance, by Schurr (1987), 
Roszkowski and Snelbecker (1990), Loke and Tan (1992), and O’Clock and 
Devine (1995). Experts in these studies were professional buyers, 
engineers, mathematicians and auditors, respectively. Fagley and Kruger 
(1986), in contrast, find no framing effect with school psychology experts. 
As mentioned above, Shanteau (1992) suggests that professionals’ 
decisions differ with the domain on which they have  achieved expertise. It 
                                                                 
11 Kühberger (1998), Levin et al. (1998) and Traub (1999) provide literature surveys. Levin et al. (1998) 
distinguish four outcomes with respect to the prediction of prospect theory: 1) non-reversals, 2) opposite 
reversals, 3) choice shifts and 4) choice reversals. We use the same categories, as well. 
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is a good question, whether the results of experts on auditing or 
mathematics can be generalized.  
Whether the decisions of politicians -as experts in the domain of 
political choice- in an experimental or hypothetical environment differ from 
non-expert subjects has not been studied before to the best of our 
knowledge. The comparative advantage of studying framing effects in this 
domain of expertise rather than another is that a politicians’ persuasive 
power may hinge crucially upon the skills of handling framing effects, in 
depicting -according to the requirement- a glass as ‘half-full’ or as ‘half-
empty’12. Since they are public persons, politicians’ fate relates 
significantly to the right touch of wording also13. Hence, we test for 
framing effects in a meaningful domain of expertise.  
Although we report the responses collected by Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) in this paper, they have only limited validity as control with 
regard to the responses of our subject pool of politicians who have a PhD in 
economics. Quattrone and Tversky inquired presumably students of 
sociology or psychology in the US such that expertise is not the only 
possible source of different results. On one hand, Brandts et al (2002) 
reported that Spanish students are more individualistic in public goods 
experiments than American students14. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence that economics and psychology students behave differently15. 
Hence, we employ economics students at the University of Valencia as 
control group. 
                                                                 
12 This quality they share with other professionals as diplomats or lawyer, in principle. 
13 E.g., Traub (1999) reports that a German Minister of Family Affairs stumbled on the proposal to 
introduce ‘tax fines for childless’ which made it to the headlines in 1994. Though several indirect 
surcharges for childless already existed in the German tax system, the proposal provoked indignation. 
14 Brandts’ observation has been confirmed recently by data reported in Fatas and Neugebauer (2003) 
and Croson et al. (2004). Also, Roth et al. (1995) and Buchan et al. (2002) reported significant differences 
across culture in bargaining and investment experiments, respectively. 
15 Marwell and Ames (1981) report that economics students behave more “rational” in public goods 
experiments than their control group of psychology and sociology students. Isaac et al. (1985), however, 
failed to reproduce such evidence. Fagley and Miller (1987) examined framing in decision making under 
risk. They reported a choice reversal with students from the college of education and a non-reversal with 
MBA candidates, the latter choosing less risk regardless of framing. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
experimental design and alludes to the different subject pools. Section 3 
describes the questionnaire and reports the findings of our research. 
Section 4 summarizes the main results and concludes. 
 
2- Subject pools & design details  
In section 3, we report on the answers to two questionnaires each 
involving five problems on political candidates and public referenda, which 
replicate the research of Quattrone and Tversky (1988). The first four 
problems are used to examine responses between subjects and the last 
one examines responses within subjects. The questionnaires to which 
subjects answered contained either the questions labeled 1A-4A or 1B-4B 
and problem 5 as represented below16. Indeed, subjects were not informed 
about the existence of 2 questionnaires. The problems are used to test the 
predictions of expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954) against Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979, 1992) prospect theory. We proceed in the same way as Quattrone 
and Tversky and collect the experimental data by means of hypothetical 
questions. As in Quattrone and Tversky (p.722), ‘respondents were asked to 
imagine actually facing the choice described, and they were assured that 
… there were no correct or incorrect answers.’ There are troubles with the 
approach, as Quattrone and Tversky (p. 720) notice 
 
[…] The use of hypothetical problems raises obvious questions 
regarding the generality and the applicability of the finding. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the use of carefully worded questions 
can address key issues regarding people’s values and beliefs so long 
as respondents take the questions seriously and have no particular 
                                                                 
16 There is a difference to the setting of Quattrone and Tversky, in fact. Quattrone and Tversky used a 
new cohort for almost every problem. In our study, all subjects were asked to respond to the entire set of 
problems.  
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reason to disguise or misrepresent their true preferences. Our 
results, of course, do not provide definitive conclusion about political 
decision making, but they may shed light on the formation of 
political judgment and stimulate new hypotheses that can be tested 
in national election surveys in the years to come. […] 
 
Indeed, for the purpose of testing the external validity of Quattrone and 
Tversky’s experimental results this problem appears of minor importance, 
given the reference study proceeds in the same way. 
2.1-The expert subjects (ES) 
There are seve ral characterizations of expertise in the literature. Probably 
the most compressed one is by Chi et al (1982) who associate expertise 
with “the possession of a large body of knowledge and procedural skill” 
within a task domain17. Our study involves (hypothetical) political decisions 
to be taken on economic variables. According to the definition of Chi et al., 
thus, experts should have knowledge and experience in public allocation 
processes and economic policy decisions. The definition of the task domain 
may apply to two groups: politicians or bureaucrats (with a strong 
economics background). Whereas Potters and van Winden (2000) dealt with 
bureaucrats (i.e., civil servants), we focus on politicians’ decisions. 
All politicians of our sample have or had been in charge of big public 
budgets and, therefore, had been involved in decisions directly related to 
public spending or economic policies. The budgets over which they made 
their decisions were usually on a scale of billions of Euros. They were 
either public administration officials or economic policy advisors, or both. 
Thus, they had a direct relationship with policy making. They were or had 
                                                                 
17 The idea behind it is that experts, relative to non experts, have in memory better and more complex 
representations of the task domain, so their decision strategies are richer and more complete (see also 
Davis and Solomon (1989)). Shanteau (1988) outlines a partial list of characteristics of expert, including: 
1) highly developed perceptual/attentional abilities, 2) an ability to decompose and simplify complex 
problems, 3) greater creativity when faced with novel problems, 4) ability to communicate their 
expertise to others, 5) strong sense of self-confidence in their abilities, and 6) extensive, up-to-date 
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been elected directly by voters or indirectly by political representatives in 
control of some public department. The list of directly political mandates 
occupied by our expert subject pool included the four elected parliaments 
and cabinets directly chosen in Spain (European Parliament, Spanish 
National Parliament, Regional Parliament and Local Councils) and some 
non-direct mandates (e.g., mayors who have to be elected directly by the 
majority of the town councilors)18. Moreover, they were or have been 
members of one of the Spanish public universities and all were having a 
PhD in economics. 
A total of 32 expert subjects (hereafter ES) participated in the 
present study. To contact them, we searched the lists of four different 
universities (all the existing ones in the county Valencia) containing all 
PhDs in economics over the past 25 years. Within, we found 38 subjects 
with expertise on political decision making as described above and invited 
them personally to participate in the survey19. In all but one case, in which 
the questionnaire and the instructions were mailed, we handed them over 
personally to the 32 volunteers. After a short briefing, subjects were left 
alone in their offices to fill in the questionnaire. Thereafter, respondents 
placed their questionnaires in a blank envelope and inserted them in a 
sealed box. The box was opened not before the last envelope had been 
inserted, thus, protection of data privacy was ensured. 
2.2-The non-expert subjects (NES) 
The control group of non-expert subjects (hereafter NES) consisted of 
economics and labor undergraduates at the University of Valencia. None of 
them had any experience with politics (other than being young voters). 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
content knowledge”. Rohrbaugh and Shanteau (1999) argue that “experts are usually identified as the 
most experienced, capable, and successful individuals within a specific domain”. 
18 The mayors and councilors administrated towns of 50.000 to 750.000 inhabitants. The list of non-direct 
mandates subjects held included: economic policy advisory unit of the Spanish prime minister, member 
of regional governmental cabinets, political controller of Spanish public banks, regional governmental 
budget officer, general director for economics & finance of regional governments, general director for 
the public auditing institute of regional governments and board member of the national trade unions. 
19 They received a general explanation alluding to the purposes of our study. Anonymity was ensured by 
a detailed clarification of our procedures. 
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A total of 309 students participated voluntarily. The experiment was 
conducted in the classroom. After a short briefing, they went through their 
questionnaires. The procedure was confidential and anonymous. The 
classroom setting, in principle, should replicate the conditions of 
Quattrone and Tversky (1988) with Spanish economics (2nd year) and labor 
students (3rd students)20.  
3-The Results 
This section reports the results of our research. It is organized in 4 
subsections. The first 2 subsections, i.e., 3.1-3.2, focus on framing effects, 
in the third one, i.e., section 3.3, we focus on the common ratio effect, 
and, finally, section 3.4 provides between subject pools comparisons. 
Framing effects are defined as preference reversals induced by the 
framing of a choice problem (see, e.g., Traub (1999), p. 26). In 3.1 we 
consider two problems in which the reference point is affected by framing. 
With the first problem we examine the impact of framing on risky choice; 
with the second one, we investigate the status quo bias and its common 
explanation loss aversion by means of non-risky prospects. The possible 
outcomes can be perceived as gains or as losses in relation to the 
reference point. In subsection 3.2 we look at framing non-risky prospects, 
where the reference point is not affected directly. Framing in 3.2 involves 
psychophysical manipulation of the presented figures. The impact that 
framing has on response is examined by a 2 (framing) ´ 2 (response) c2 
analysis. We take into account the possibility of opposite reversals, i.e., 
significant choice shifts opposite to the predictions of prospect theory. 
Hence, our data will be subject to two tailed tests, the null hypotheses are 
given by rational choice theory in each case. The results are summarized 
below in the Tables 1 and 2.  
                                                                 
20 We tested homogeneity of both subject pools’ responses before we pooled them. 
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3.1-Reference point dependence 
Expected utility theory allows for risk aversion, which implies a concave 
shape of the utility function (the idea is as old as Bernoulli (1738)). As a 
consequence, people prefer a certain amount of money to a risky prospect 
that yields the same expected value. The same idea is valid in prospect 
theory, though the ‘value function’ is s-shaped: it is concave for gains, and 
convex for losses. The decision maker’s choice for losses, according to 
prospect theory, is the mirror image of the corresponding gains. If losses 
are at stake, people prefer a risky prospect to a certain loss in the amount 
of the prospect’s expected value. Whether a decision involves gains or 
losses depends on the decision maker’s reference point. The reference 
point corresponds to the reflection point of the value function. Following 
the problems of Quattrone and Tversky (1988), we illustrate the reference 
point concept in this and in the following subsection.  
 
Problem 1A – gain framing condition (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=147, n(QT)=89)21 
Suppose there is a continent consisting of five nations: Alpha, Beta Gamma, 
Delta and Epsilon. The nations all have very similar systems of government 
and economics, are long time members of a continental common market, and 
are therefore expected to produce very similar standards of living and rates 
of inflation. Imagine you are a citizen of Alpha, which is about to hold its 
presidential election. The two presidential candidates, Brown and Green, 
differ from each other primarily in the economic policies they are known to 
favor and are sure to implement. These policies were studied by Alpha’s 
two leading economists who are of equal expertise and are impartial as to 
the result of the election. After studying the policies advocated by Brown 
and Green and the policies currently being pursued by the other four 
nations, each economist made a forecast. The forecast consisted of three 
predictions about the expected standard of living index (SLI). The SLI 
measures the goods and services consumed (directly or indirectly) by the 
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average citizen yearly. It is expressed in Continental Monetary Units (CMU) 
per capita so that the higher the SLI the higher the level of economic 
prosperity. The three projections concerned 
 
1. the average SLI to be expected among the nations Beta, Gamma, Delta 
and Epsilon 
2. the SLI to be expected by following Brown’s economic policy 
3. the SLI to be expected by following Green’s economic policy 
 
The forecasts made by each economist are summarized in the following 
table: 
     
 Projected SLI in CMU per Capita 
 Other Four 
Nations 
Brown’s 
Policy 
Green’s 
Policy 
Economist 1 43.000 65.000 51.000 
Economist 2 45.000 43.000 53.000 
 
Suppose that as a citizen of Alpha you were asked to cast your vote for 
Brown or Green. On the exclusive basis of the information provided, whom 
would you vote for?  
 
The other group of respondents received an identical problem with 
the difference that the forecasts about the other four nations were 
altered. 
 
Problem 1B – loss framing condition (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=162, n(QT)=96) 
 Projected SLI in AMU per Capita 
 Other Four 
Nations 
Brown’s 
Policy 
Green’s 
Policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
21 The numbers n of respondents to this and all following problems are given in parentheses: the 
number of experts, non-expert subjects and Quattrone and Tversky’s subjects, respectively. 
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Economist 1 63.000 65.000 51.000 
Economist 2 65.000 43.000 53.000 
 
The other countries’ SLI is induced as reference point in these 
problems, because the others were said to have a similar living standard. 
Thus, the reference point moves from an expected 44.000 CMU in problem 
1A to an expected 64.000 CMU in problem 1B. According to prospect theory, 
outcomes projected for Brown and Green, hence, would be treated as gains 
in the former problem and as losses in the latter one. Risk or uncertainty 
is introduced through the notion that forecasts are of equal expertise, 
such that it is reasonable to believe that forecasts occur with equal 
probability. Note that the policies of Brown and Green should yield about 
the same expected value, but Brown’s policy spreads more around the 
expected value and appears riskier than Green’s policy. Prospect theory 
involves a reflection effect, i.e., risk aversion in the domain of gains and 
risk seeking in the domain of losses. Thus, in problem 1A prospect theory 
expects more votes for Green than in problem 1B. In contrast, rational 
choice theory expects similar choices in both problems because it 
considers the other countries’ SLI as irrelevant. The results are presented 
in figure 1. This and all later figures are arranged such that according to 
the prediction of prospect theory you should see an “X”, a solid line 
crossing a dotted line from above; expected utility, in contrast, would 
suggest coinciding lines.  
Quattrone and Tversky (1988) find support for a reflection effect, as 
they observe a choice shift from more risk aversion in problem 1A to less 
risk aversion in problem 1B22. A 2 (framing) ´ 2 (response) c2 analysis 
showed that framing and response are significantly related (c2(1) = 9.281, 
p=.002) –see also table 1. 
                                                                 
22 We apply the same classification scheme as Levin et al (1998). Accordingly, a choice shift differs from a 
choice reversal in that the proportion of risky choices differs across conditions but is not both 
significantly greater than 50% in the negative condition and significantly less than 50% in the positive 
condition [Levin (1998, p. 153)]. 
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Fig. 1. The percentage of respondents voting Green or Brown within each framing 
condition 
 
Yet, our data do not support the prediction of prospect theory. On 
one hand, the observed responses of the NES suggest no choice reversal as 
proposed by prospect theory (c2(1) = 0.722, p=.396)23. On the other, the data 
on the experts reveal that under gain framing 79% of the expert subjects 
vote Brown whereas in the loss framing condition 59% of the ES vote 
Green. The changes of the modal choice are thus opposing to the 
prediction of prospect theory as shown in figure 124. In other words, if we 
assumed the existence of a reference point, our data would rather suggest 
that experts are risk seeking under gain framing and risk averse in loss 
framing conditions than otherwise. Yet, given the small sample size of the 
expert subject pool, a test indicates no choice reversal ((c2(1) = 2.079, 
p=.149).  
Levin et al (1998) report a wide variety of evidence from choice 
reversals and non-reversals to opposite reversals in risky choice framing. 
                                                                 
23 We conclude that in the NES the choice between the two candidates was not significantly influenced by 
the projected SLI in the other countries. This observation can eventually result from a difference of 
cultural background. For instance, the Spanish prefer less paid but permanent positions over well paid 
but less secure ones. From this perspective, it might not seem so surprising that most NES choose the 
less risky candidate. 
24 The opposing choice to prospect theory induces a prospect of yielding a strong leader economy or one 
of same size under gain framing whereas a relatively sure outcome of not falling too far behind the 
others under loss framing. 
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They conclude that typically a choice shift occurs (and not necessarily a 
reversal25) such that risk aversion is more frequent under positive framing 
than under negative framing [Levin et al. (1998, p.181)]. This observation is 
consistent with the subject pool of Quattrone and Tversky (1988). In 
contrast to responses in Quattrone and Tversky (who report a 50% risk 
seeking in problem 1B), the responses of the NES indicate risk aversion 
regardless of framing (79% and 72% respectively). This result is consistent 
with the findings of Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) and Fagley and Miller 
(1987). Fagley and Miller reported less risk seeking of business students in 
the domain of losses in comparison to students of educational sciences26. 
Evidence with expert subjects on (risky) framing is similarly inconclusive. 
On one hand there is some evidence as Kühberger (1998) suggest (see 
introduction). On the other hand, e.g., Fagley and Kruger (1986) report no 
effects of expert subjects in risky choice framing.  
In the second problem of the questionnaire the predictions of 
prospect theory’s value function and reference dependence are applied to 
riskless choice. A fundamental property of the value function is that its 
shape looms steeper for losses than for corresponding gains, i.e., -v(-x) > 
v(x). Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) call this property -that the 
displeasure of losing money is greater than the pleasure of winning the 
same amount of money- the principle of loss aversion. As an important 
consequence of loss aversion, a certain payoff (the status quo) is preferred 
to a risky one with the same expected value. The same statement, 
however, is also consistent with the concavity of the utility function27. In 
classical utility theory, yet, the greater impact of losses in comparison to 
gains is necessarily coupled with the presence of risk. Since loss aversion 
                                                                 
25 In accordance with Levin et al. (1998), a reference reversal implies a significant share (above 50%) of 
responses as predicted by prospect theory in both framing conditions. We checked significance with 
binomial tests the results of which are suppressed. 
26 Kühberger (1995) discusses alternative models that describe choice behavior under framing as fuzzy 
trace theory of Reyna and Brainerd (1991a, 1991b) and probabilistic mental models theory of Gigerenzer 
et al. (1991). Particularly, the probabilistic mental models theory can accommodate also opposite 
reversals and choice shifts. 
27 See Tversky and Kahneman (1991) for a treatise of loss aversion in riskless choice. 
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applies also to riskless choice we are able to contrast prospect theory with 
expected utility theory. Loss aversion implies that the status quo policy is 
higher valued than a policy that yields the same expected value. If a 
decision maker is indifferent between two policies C and F from a neutral 
reference point he will prefer C [F] over F [C] if his reference point is C [F]. 
People will only switch to a new policy if they strictly prefer it to the old 
one. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) introduced the term ‘status quo 
bias’ for this effect of reference position and reported evidence in a wide 
range of decisions. Quattrone and Tversky illustrate the status quo bias -
the pattern that gives the incumbent politician an advantage over the rival 
candidate- in the following pair of problems28. 
 
Problem 2A – incumbent Frank (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=147, n(QT)= 91): 
Imagine there were another presidential contest between two new 
candidates, Frank and Carl. Frank wishes to keep the level of inflation and 
unemployment at their current level. The rate of inflation is currently at 9% 
and the rate of unemployment is at 15%. Carl proposes a policy that would 
decrease the rate of inflation by 3% while increasing the rate of 
unemployment by 7 %29. Suppose that as a citizen of Alpha, you were 
asked to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. Please indicate your vote.  
 
Problem 2B – incumbent Carl (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=162, n(QT)=89): 
Carl wishes to keep the level of inflation and unemployment at their current 
level. The rate of inflation is currently at 6% and the rate of unemployment 
is at 22%. Frank proposes a policy that would increase the rate of inflation 
by 3% while decreasing the rate of unemployment by 7%.  
 
                                                                 
28 Traub (1999) remarks empirical evidence for the comparative advantage of the office holder over the 
rival candidate in elections comes from Germany. The former chancellor Kohl was the first office holder 
since 1949 to lose a general election (after setting up a record of winning the elections four times).  
29 The indicated levels differ from Quattrone and Tversky (1988) to increase realism of the task. Frank’s 
[Carl’s] policy of Quattrone and Tversky involved inflation and unemployment rates of 42% [23%] and 
15% [22%], respectively. Spain’s levels of inflation and unemployment rates were 7.5% and 18.5% at the 
time of the experiment and the elasticity between inflation and unemployment was estimated at 3/7.  
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Note that the rates of inflation and unemployment implied by 
Frank’s [Carl’s] policy are 15% [22%] and 9% [6%], respectively. Only the 
location of the status quo differs between the problems. Due to loss 
aversion, prospect theory would predict more votes for Frank in problem 2A 
than in problem 2B and for Carl vice versa (given decision makers are 
indifferent between both policies from a third reference point position). 
Quattrone and Tversky (1988) report a choice reversal favoring prospect 
theory over expected utility theory; the modal response to both problems 
induced the status quo. A 2 (framing) ´ 2 (response) c2 analysis showed 
that framing and response were significantly related (c2(1) = 11.735, 
p=.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The percentage of respondents voting Frank or Carl within each framing 
condition 
 
The majority of our two subject pools voted Frank in both framing 
conditions. This result indicates that subjects prefer strictly the policy of 
less inflation to the one of less unemployment. In favor of the status quo 
bias one can say that we observe a choice shift at least for the expert 
subjects. When Frank is the incumbent 100% vote him whereas he wins 
the vote of 82% when Carl is the incumbent. The result is significant at 
10% (c2(1) = 2,921 p=.087).  
The data of the NES yet do not show any indication of a status quo 
bias. Frank receives even more votes when he represents the rival 
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candidate. The c2 analysis reveals that there is no choice reversal (c2(1) = 
.550, .p=.458). Hence, we are not able to support the predictions of prospect 
theory with respect to reference point dependence30. In the following 
section we will have a look at more subtle framing conditions. 
3.2-Ratio-Difference Principle 
In the previous section otherwise equivalent problems become distinct 
owing to a change in the reference point position. Though it is hardly 
stated in the theoretical literature, the fundamentals of the neoclassical 
theory build on the assumption of invariance to descriptive changes (cf. 
Arrow (1982)31). A choice reversal in such problems thus violates the 
principle of description invariance. This section provides even a sharper 
test of description invariance, as the considered problems differ only in 
positive and negative framing and affect neither the gain domain nor the 
loss domain of the decision maker The standard example of such 
perceptional manipulation has been mentioned in the introduction: 
describing a glass filled up to the half as ‘half-full’ is unquestionable 
equivalent to describing it as ‘half-empty’. Hence, preference reversals that 
arise upon subtle differences in wording cannot be justified through the 
reflection point effect and would underline the absolute need for a 
psychological analysis of choice. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) illustrate 
such failures of descriptive invariance with the following problems 3 and 4. 
 
Problem 3A – negative framing condition (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=166, n(QT)=126): 
Political decision making often involves a considerable number of trade-
offs. A program that benefits one segment of the population may work for 
the disadvantage of another segment. Policies designed to lead to higher 
                                                                 
30 It should be noted again that prospect theory predicts the status quo bias only if the decision maker is 
indifferent between 2 prospects. Since the majority of the NES selects Frank in both conditions they reveal 
preference for the corresponding policy. 
31 Arrow (1982, p.8) states: “The chosen element depends on the opportunity set from which the choice is 
to be made, independently of how the set is described.” 
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rates of employment have an adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were 
faced with the decision of adopting one of two economic policies. 
If program J is adopted, 10% of the work force would be 
unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%. If program K is 
adopted, 5% of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of 
inflation would be 17%. The following table summarizes the alternative 
policies and their likely consequences: 
 
 
 
Policy 
Work Force 
Unemployed 
(%) 
Rate of  
Inflation 
(%) 
Program J 10 12 
Program K 5 17 
 
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program J or 
program K. With the provided information. Which would you select?  
 
Problem 3B – positive framing condition (n(ES)=16, n(NES)=142, n(QT)=133): 
 
 
 
Policy 
Work Force 
Employed 
(%) 
Rate of  
Inflation 
(%) 
Program J 90 12 
Program K 95 17 
 
Note that each program produces the same outcomes in both 
problems. After all, to say 10% of the workforce will be unemployed is 
equivalent to saying that 90% will be employed. The data of Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) reveal a change of the modal response from program K in 
problem 3A to program J in problem 3B. The choice shift (36% and 54% 
adopt program J in 3A and 3B, respectively) violates descriptive invariance 
significantly, as a 2 (framing) ´ 2 (response) c2 test reveals (c2 (1) = 8.865, 
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p=.003). Quattrone and Tversky credit the decision makers’ apparent 
sensitivity to the unemployment rate rather than to the employment rate 
to a psychophysical concept they call ratio-difference principle. 
Accordingly, the impact on perception is greater the larger the ratio of 
outcomes between the two alternatives. A change from program J to K 
would involve a ratio of 2 (=10%/5%) under negative framing in problem 
3A, whereas under positive framing in 3B the ratio would be 0.947 
(=90%/95%). Since the ratio in the former problem is greater than in the 
latter, Quattrone and Tversky conjecture that program K stands out more 
focal in problem 3A than in 3B. Hence, the unemployment rate involved by 
program J should be perceived as a social nuisance in 3A rather than in 
3B.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The percentage of respondents choosing program J & K in each framing 
condition 
 
Figure 3 displays subjects’ responses to problem 3. As the graph for 
the expert subjects indicates an ‘X’-pattern, their choices do take the 
same direction as the ones of the subjects of Quattrone and Tversky: 20% 
and 50% choose J under negative and positive framing, respectively. The c2 
test confirms a choice shift for the expert subjects ((c2(1) = 3.044, p=.081). 
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The choices of the NES sample do not change into the direction predicted 
by prospect theory and the c2 analysis indicates an opposite reversal (c2(1) 
= 5.645, p=.018).  
There are many applications of the ratio-difference principle to 
political choice, as Quattrone and Tversky emphasize. The following pair of 
problems should demonstrate how framing statistics can influence people’s 
perceived need for public goods provision. 
 
Problem 4A – negative framing condition (n(ES)=14, n(NES)=146, n(QT)=125): 
The country of Delta is deeply interested in reducing the crime rate among 
its immigrants groups. The Department of Justice has been allocated 100 
million of Delta’s Monetary Units (DMU 100M) for establishing a crime 
prevention program aimed at immigrant youths. The program would provide 
the youths with job opportunities and recreational facilities, inasmuch as 
criminal acts tend to be committed by unemployed youths who have little to 
do with their time. A decision must be made between two programs 
currently being considered. The programs differ from each other primarily 
in how the DMU 100M would be distributed between Delta’s two largest 
immigrant communities, the Alphans and the Betans. There are roughly the 
same number of Alphans and Betans in Delta. Statistics have shown that by 
the age of 25, 3.7% of all Alphans have a criminal record, whereas 1.2% of 
all Betans have a criminal record. 
The following two programs are being considered. Program J would 
allocate to the Alphan community DMU 55M and to the Betan community 
DMU 45M. Program K would allocate DMU 65M to the Alphan community 
and to the Betan community DMU 35M. The following table summarizes 
these alternative programs: 
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Program 
To Alphan 
Community 
To Betan 
Community 
Program J 55M 45M 
Program K 65M 35M 
Imagine you were faced with the decision between program J and 
program K. In light of the available crime statistics, which would you select?  
 
The respondents of the second group received an identical problem 
with the only difference that the statistical records of both communities 
were now positively framed: 
 
Problem 4B – positive framing condition (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=156, n(QT)=126): 
Statistics have shown that by the age of 25, 96.3% of all Alphans have no 
criminal record, whereas 98.8% of all Betans have no criminal record.  
 
The data of Quattrone and Tversky reveal a choice reversal, as the 2 
(framing) ´ 2 (response) c2 test highlights (c2 (1) = 22.644 p=.000). We 
observe a choice reversal for the NES (c2(1) = 38.786 p=.000), as well. In 
the case of the ES, 50% and 71% choose program J under negative and 
positive framing, respectively. Although figure 4 provides a similar graph 
for every subject pool, the choice change in the ES sample is statistically 
insignificant ((c2(1) = 1.372, p=.242).  
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. 4. The percentage of respondents choosing program J & K in each framing condition 
 
Table 1. Summary of responses in framing problems b 
  
 
Expert Subjects 
Non Expert 
Subjects 
Quattrone 
Tversky (1988) 
Problem A B A B A B 
1 Brown 0.67 0.41 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.50 
 Green 0.33 0.59 0.79 0.83 0.72 0.50 
 N 15 17 147 162 89 96 
 Result a Non-reversal Non-reversal Choice shift 
 c2(1) 2,079 0,722 9,281*** 
2 Frank 1.00 0.82 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.39 
 Carl 0.00 0.18 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.61 
 N 15 17 147 162 91 89 
 Result a Choice shift Non-reversal Choice reversal 
 c2(1) 2,921* 0,550 11,735*** 
3 Program J 0.20 0.50 0.81 0.69 0.36 0.54 
 
Program 
K 0.80 0.50 0.19 0.31 0.64 0.46 
 N 15 16 166 142 126 133 
 Result a Choice shift 
Opposite 
reversal Choice reversal 
 c2(1) 3,044* 5,645** 8,865*** 
4 Program J 0.50 0.71 0.42 0.77 0.41 0.71 
 
Program 
K 0.50 0.29 0.58 0.23 0.59 0.29 
 N 14 17 146 156 125 126 
 Result a Non-reversal Choice reversal Choice reversal 
 c2(1) 1,372 38,786*** 22,644*** 
a. A non-reversal indicates that framing has no significant impact (at 10% level) on choice 
as predicted by prospect theory. Both, choice shift and choice reversal indicate a significant 
change of choices in the direction of prospect theory. A choice reversal, furthermore, 
indicates that the modal choice is significantly greater than 50% in both framing 
conditions. Finally, an opposite reversal indicates that framing has a significant impact, 
but contrary to the prediction of prospect theory. b. Comparison between subjects.  
***<.01, **<.05, *<.1 significance level (two tailed). 
 
Before discussing the different responses between subject pools in 
section 3.4 we go into one of Allais’ well-known paradoxes in section 3.3. 
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3.3-The Common Ratio Effect  
In the early fifties, Allais (1953) introduced two examples to the economics 
literature in which actual choice behavior may systematically deviate from 
the predictions of expected utility theory. One of these anomalies reported 
by Allais, the so-called common ratio effect, has challenged the 
assumption of well-defined preferences. The common ratio effect is usually 
presented in a pair of binary choice problems under risk in which one 
binary choice problem is derived from the other by multiplying the winning 
probability with a common factor. People violate expected utility theory if 
this common ratio modification of the winning probability induces a change 
in choice.  
The last pair of problems addresses this kind of observed violations 
of expected utility theory in a within-subject treatment, i.e., respondents 
reply to both problems. 
 
Problem 5A – sure/risky prospect (n(ES)=32, n(NES)=308, n(QT)=88): 
The state of Epsilon is interested in developing clean and safe alternative 
sources of energy. Its Department of Natural Resources is considering two 
programs for establishing solar energy within the state. If program X is 
adopted, then it is virtually certain that over the next four years the state will 
save 20 million of Continental Monetary Units (CMU 20M) in energy 
expenditures. If program Y is adopted, then there is a 80% chance that the 
state will save CMU 30M in energy expenditures over the next four years 
and a 20% chance that because of cost overruns, the program will produce 
no savings in energy expenditures at all. The following table summarizes 
the alternative policies and their probable consequences. 
 
Policy Savings in Energy Expenditures 
X CMU 20M with certainty 
Y 80% chance of saving CMU 30M, 
20% chance of no savings 
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Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program X or 
program Y. Which would you select?  
 
Problem 5B – risky/risky prospect (n(ES)=32, n(NES)=308, n(QT)=88): 
The state of Gamma is also interested in developing clean and safe 
alternative sources of energy. Its Department of Natural Resources is 
considering two programs for establishing solar energy within the state. If 
program A is adopted, then there is a 25% chance that over the next four 
years the state will save 20 million of Continental Monetary Units (CMU 
20M) in energy expenditures and a 75% chance that because of cost 
overruns, the program will produce no savings in energy expenditures at 
all. If program B is adopted, there is a 20% chance that the state will save 
CMU 30M in energy expenditures and an 80% chance that because of cost 
overruns, the program will produce no savings in energy expenditures at 
all. The following table summarizes the alternative policies and their 
probable consequences. 
 
Policy a Savings in Energy Expenditures 
X’ 25% chance of EMU 20M savings, 
75% chance of no savings 
Y’ 20% chance of EMU 30M savings, 
80% chance of no savings 
a. Labels X’ and Y’ are used for ease of exposition. In the 
questionnaire we used labels A and B. 
 
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program A or 
program B. Which would you select?  
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Fig. 5. The percentage of respondents choosing policy X & Y in each framing condition 
 
The choices are depicted in figure 5, 62.5% and 75% of the expert 
subjects chose policy X and X’, respectively. However, because the same 
subjects responded to both problems, we are going to analyze the frequency 
of the four possible combinations, reported in table 2: XX’, XY’, YX’ and YY’.  
Note that problem 5B is derived from 5A by multiplying the 
probability of savings with a common ratio of one fourth. The rational 
choices imply either the policy pairs XX’ or YY’, whereas the other 
combinations violate expected utility theory32. The literature refers to a 
violation in this context as the ‘common ratio effect’. Prospect theory 
accommodates the common ratio effect through its probability weighting 
function, a monotonic, nonlinear function of ‘stated’ probability33. The 
crucial properties of the probability weighting function with respect to 
problem 5 are 1) overweighting of low probabilities, and 2) over-proportional 
underweighting of moderate and high probabilities. Hence, a reduction of 
each outcome’s stated probability by a common factor has a greater impact 
on the decision weight in case of a certain outcome than on a risky one. 
This issue is referred to as the ‘certainty effect’. Thus, prospect theory 
would allow for the common value effect in problem 5 if the involved choice 
pair is XY’. Actually, the common ratio effect occurs in our experiment 
more frequently in the direction predicted by prospect theory, i.e., XY’, 
than YX’ (see table 2). Of 10 ES (31%) whose choice pairs infringe the 
                                                                 
32 The independence axiom of expected utility theory implies that if X is preferred to Y then a 
probability mix of X, pX, 0 < p < 1, must be preferred to pY, and vice versa. 
 27
prediction of expected utility theory 7 (70%) deviate according to the 
certainty effect; 86 of 154 NES (56%) fit this pattern, as well. The result is 
significant for the NES and insignificant for the ES as the results of a two 
tailed sign test reveal (p=.074 and p=.172, respectively).  
Table 2. Summary of responses in common ratio problem a 
ES (n=32) NES (n=308) Quattrone/ Tversky (n=88) 
Adopted program X’ Y’ X’ Y’ X’ Y’ 
X 0.53 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.43 
Y 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.18 
Certainty effect No  Yes Yes 
a. Comparison within subjects. 
 
Given the high number of common ratio effects, rational choice 
theory cannot be supported in absolute terms. Nevertheless, within the ES 
pool we observe 69% consistent choices, which is relatively good compared 
to the other subject pools. Only one half of responses in Quattrone and 
Tversky and the NES were consistent with the neoclassical model. A 2 
(subject pool) ´ 2 (consistent or inconsistent choice) c2 test indicates that 
the ES respond significantly more frequently consistent with rational 
choice theory than the NES (c2 (1) = 4.082, p=.043)34. 
3.4-Subject Pool Effect 
In this section, we highlight differences and similarities between subject 
pools. Before we do so, we repeat that our data is not directly comparable 
to Quattrone and Tversky, because they used a new cohort for each 
decision problem, whereas our subjects were asked to respond to all 
problems.  
As pointed out in the preceding sections, we find generally less 
support for the predictions of prospect theory than Quattrone and Tversky 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
33 If a problem states the probability of an outcome as 0 < p < 1, the decision weight assigned to the 
outcome is 0 < p(p) < 1. The literature has shown that people’s perception of probabilities is inaccurate 
(see footnote 9). Given the stated probability, the decision weight represents the perceived probability. 
34 The same test procedure yields significant results, as well, when applied to the ES’ choices and the data 
of Quattrone and Tversky (c2 (1) = 3.738., p= 0.053). Between the data of the NES and Quattrone and 
Tversky the result is insignificant (c2 (1) = .035, p= .851). 
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(1988). In problem 5, for instance, the choices of the ES violate rational 
choice theory significantly less than both other samples. Nevertheless, as 
a comparison of figures 1-5 indicates, the differences between the studies 
are not always as severe as in problem 5. In problem 4, for instance, the 
figures indicate that all subject pools responded similarly to both questions 
A and B. This issue is also confirmed by the test results recorded in table 
3. In the table, we present the statistics resulting from a 2 (subject pool) ´ 
2 (response) c2 test for each question A and B of the problems 1-4; 
significance is indicated by an asterisk35. In the last column, the test 
statistics for problem 4 are reported. If we consider, for instance, the 
differences between ES and NES with respect to question 4A the resulting 
test statistic, which is approximately c2 distributed with one degree of 
freedom, is 0.353 indicating insignificant differences.  
Table 3. Subject pool differences: c2(1) test results 
  Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3 Problem 4 
 Question ES QT a ES QT a ES QT a ES QT a 
NES A 14.958*** 1.502 8.265** 0.060 27.568*** 61.168*** 0.353 0.027 
 B 5.584** 31.049*** 1.625 18.359*** 2.355** 6.441*** 0.340 1.437 
QT a A 8.556***  7.556**  1.471  0.438  
 B 0.450  10.631***  0.098  0.000  
a. QT indicates the test results including the data of Quattrone and Tversky (1988). 
***<.01, **<.05, *<.1 significance level (two tailed).  
 
The differences between the ES and the NES are significant in 
problems 1 and 3 in both questions A and B, and in problem 2 in question A 
where ES’ choices were extreme. The difference is particularly strong 
under gain framing in problem 1A indicating less risk aversion of the ES in 
gain framing conditions, and under negative framing in 3A.  
In comparison with the study of Quattrone and Tversky, the ES’ 
choices differ significantly in problems 1, 2 and 5. These problems are 
either subject to a reference point, risk or both. 
                                                                 
35 The results of problem 5 cannot be analyzed likewise with a c2 test procedure between subject pools, 
because the answers to the questions A and B are dependent. However, we report in section 3.3 the 
results of a c2 test to find that the ES violate rational choice theory less than the NES. 
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4-Summary 
In this paper we have focused on the impact of expertise in a political 
decision making experiment. The reported exploration is based on 
Quattrone and Tversky (1988)’s study of political choice problems. We 
compared their observations to the responses of our both subject pools 1) 
real-world politicians and 2) non-expert economics student subjects.  
As far as our sample size of expert subjects permits to draw 
conclusions,36 our results may be summarized as follows: First, the expert 
subjects seem not immune to framing. Hence, we confirm earlier findings 
of the literature as surveyed in Kühberger (1998) and Levin et al. (1998) in 
the domain of political decision making. Second, the decisions of experts, 
in contrast to student subjects, exhibit less risk aversion under gain 
framing in problem 1, in which the economics policy of a country is set into 
context with the one of comparable countries. This observation is 
consistent with earlier results by Dyer et al. (1989). Fifth, and finally, 
experts’ decisions appeared less prone to the common ratio effect than 
inexperienced subjects. This suggestion would be consistent also with the 
observation of Potters and van Winden (2000) that experts choose relatively 
more rational. 
We do not confirm always the results of Quattrone and Tversky 
(1988). Whether the deviation is due to expertise, culture or other 
influences is inconclusive. Therefore, we assent to the demand of Ball and 
Cech (1993) for a replication of experiments with subjects from more 
representative populations. 
                                                                 
36 The results are based on 32 expert subjects. Though this is a small sample size, Potters and van Winden 
(2000)’s review suggest that there has never been any experimental study with more experts. 
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